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Friedman: Manville: Good Faith Reorganization or "Insulated" Bankruptcy

NOTES

MANVILLE: GOOD FAITH REORGANIZATION OR
"INSULATED" BANKRUPTCY
On August 26, 1982, the Manville Corporation ("Manville"), a
"Fortune 5001 company boasting annual sales of approximately two
billion dollars 2 filed for reorganization 3 under chapter 11 of the 1978
Bankruptcy Code 4 (the "New Code"). In the past several years, the
company has been hit by an onslaught of personal injury claims
based on allegations of exposure to asbestos.5 Manville's economic
1.

Williams, The Fortune Directory of the Largest U.S. Industrial Corporations,FORMay 3, 1982, at 258. Manville was listed as 181 in the nation's top 500 companies for
the year 1981, id.at 266, the most recent compilation prior to its bankruptcy petition.
2. Debtor's Affidavit Under Local Rule XI-2 at 3, In re Johns-Manville Corp., Nos. 82
B 11656 to 82 B 11676 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 26, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Debtor's
Affidavit].
3. Debtor's Petition Under Chapter 11, In re Johns-Manville Corp., Nos. 82 B 11656 to
82 B 11676 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 26, 1982). The filing was made on behalf of the
Manville Corporation and 20 affiliated companies. Debtor's Affidavit, supra note 2, at 1.
A reorganization is an alternative to liquidation. It allows a business in financial distress
to restructure its debts so that it may remain a viable company. Creditors will look to future
earnings rather than current assets for satisfaction of their claims. Elfin, Business Reorganization Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 12 PAc. L.J. 163, 164 (1980). Any payment plan,
however, must give to each creditor at least as much as he would have received in a liquidation. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (1982). A creditor may request the court to dismiss the
debtor's reorganization petition or convert it into a liquidation. Id. § 1112(b).
Upon filing for reorganization, the debtor receives the protection afforded by the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision. Id. § 362. In pertinent part, § 362 bars prospective
claimants from bringing suits which otherwise could have been brought against the debtor and
halts proceedings which are pending at the time of the filing, id. § 362(a)(1), until resolution
of the bankruptcy action. Id. § 362(c)(2).
4. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982).
5. Manville is the largest producer of asbestos in the noncommunist world. Kelly,
Manville's Bold Maneuver, TIME, Sept. 6, 1982, at 17. The company has, however, received
court approval to sell two of its subsidiary corporations. Manville will no longer mine asbestos
after this transaction. N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1983, at D3, col. 6.
Exposure to asbestos dust can result in any of three deadly diseases: "asbestosis, a chronic
disease of the lungs causing shortness of breath similar to emphysema; mesothelioma, a fatal
cancer of the chest or abdomen lining; and lung cancer." Kelly, supra at 17.
Manville was not the first corporation to seek protection from asbestos-related litigation
through the bankruptcy process. UNR Industries filed for corporate reorganization on July 29,
TUNE,
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woes, however, stem only in part from these liabilities already incurred. The company also expects to pay out large damage awards
to satisfy pending claims. In addition, tens of thousands of suits are
anticipated in future years by those individuals, previously exposed
to asbestos, but who have not yet manifested any resultant illnesses.0
The ordinary chapter 11 filing involves a debtor who is seeking
protection from current and pending financial obligations. 7
Manville's filing, however, reaches beyond these traditional parameters. It asks the bankruptcy court for relief, not only from claims
already filed, but also from those claims which the company believes
will be filed in years to come." Manville's expectation of large numbers of future claims goes beyond mere speculation. Medical studies
indicate that the injurious effects -of exposure to asbestos often do not
appear until twenty to forty years after initial contact.9 While restrictive statutes of limitations will bar some claimants, the more liberal statutes allow suit whenever the disease is manifested. 10
Manville asserts that if it must defend these suits in succeeding
years, it will be forced to "sell, liquidate or otherwise dispose of assets and dismember its businesses." ' If Manville's contention is
valid, it is inevitable that, at some future time, it will no longer have
any funds available to compensate those remaining asbestos victims.
Thus, the Manville reorganization raises the novel question of
whether the bankruptcy laws should shield a presently sound corporation from possible future economic distress.
Part I of this note outlines the genesis of Manville's asbestos1982. In re UNR Indus., 29 Bankr. 741 (N.D. Ill.
1983), appeal docketed, No. 83-1746 (7th
Cir. Apr. 26, 1983). Subsequent to Manville's filing, Amatex Corporation filed for chapter 11
protection. In re Amatex Corp., 30 Bankr. 309 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983), appeal docketed, No.
83-1843 (3d Cir. Nov. 18, 1983). For further discussion of these cases, see infra notes Il1 and

153. Since Manville is the largest corporation seeking such protection, however, its filing has
created the greatest controversy. For a sampling of reactions to the Manville action, see N.Y.
Times, Dec. 10, 1982, at DI, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1982, at DI, col. 1; N.Y. Times,
Aug. 27, 1982, at D4, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at D4, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Aug. 27,
1982, at Al, col. 6.
6. See Debtor's Affidavit, supra note 2, at 7. Epidemiology Resources, Inc. [hereinafter

cited as E.R.I.], the firm hired by Manville to project asbestos-related litigation, concluded
that 32,000 additional claims would be filed against the company. See Summary of AsbestosRelated Litigation Projection, STOCKHOLDERS & CREDITORS NEWS SERVICE CONCERNING
JOHNS-MANVILLE CORP., ET AL. 82 (Sept. 15, 1982).
7. See B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL 1 8.01 (1980).
8. Debtor's Affidavit, supra note 2, at 7-8.
9. Kelly, supra note 5, at 17.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 118-27.
11. Debtor's Affidavit, supra note 2, at 8.
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related problems and reviews the statistics concerning the company's
present and potential liabilities. Part II examines the appropriateness
of Manville's use of the bankruptcy system in order to satisfy its
legal obligations to asbestosis victims and ultimately evolve as a viable and profitable corporation. This section specifically addresses the
question of whether good faith is required in the filing of a reorganization petition and, answering this question in the affirmative, considers whether Manville has satisfied this requirement. Analysis also
focuses on issues of fairness to all parties concerned and the logistical problems which would arise in determining the rights of a presently unidentifiable class-the future claimants.12 This note concludes that since Manville is not abusing the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court or frustrating the legislative aims of the bankruptcy system, its reorganization petition was appropriately filed.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Manville's first use of asbestos, ironically called the "miracle
mineral," 13 began prior to the turn of the century. 4 The company's
founder, H.W. Johns, capitalized on the unique fire-resistant properties of the mineral by using it to strengthen building roofs. 15 The
company was prospering under his direction when he died in 1898 of
"dust phthisis pneumonitis." l There was, however, no medically recognized connection between his and other such deaths and asbestos
dust.17 Charles Manville, a Milwaukee entrepreneur, bought out the
Johns' family interest in the company in 1901 and the JohnsManville Company was born."8
The company's range of products greatly expanded under
Charles Manville's direction. By 1925, the company mined its own
asbestos and manufactured over 2000 products ranging from insulation materials to artificial beards for department store Santas. 9 The
only medical information available at that time consisted of one documented case of asbestosis in England in 1907 and an American
12. Although focusing on the Manville case, the theories discussed in this note would be
applicable to any situation involving latent illnesses.
13. Kelly, supra note 5, at 17.
14. See Coplon, Left in the Dust, Village Voice, Mar. 1, 1983, at 1, col. 2, at 17, col. I.
15. See id. at 17, col. 1.
16. Id.
17. See id.

18. Id. The corporation subsequently changed its name to the Manville Corporation on
Oct. 29, 1981. Williams, supra note 1, at 266 n.30.
19. Coplon, supra note 14, at 17, col. 2.
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Medical Association report on asbestosis published in 1928.20
Manville, therefore, saw no need to alter its practices, or to provide
its employees with any relief from their continuous exposure to asbestos and its yet unknown debilitating effects. As a result, after
each work shift, the employees--covered from head to toe with asbestos dust-returned home and exposed their families to the harmful particles.2 1
Conclusive evidence linking asbestos to asbestosis was documented in the 19301s.12 Relationships between asbestos and lung
cancer as well as mesothelioma were not established until decades
later.2 3 Manville instituted some protective measures in the 1930's,24
but its actions were not sufficient to forestall the, as yet unknown,
epidemic. Although Manville states that it followed the United
States Public Health Service standard set in 1938,5 that standard
reflected early studies that regarded presently unacceptable levels of
asbestos exposure to be "safe."2 6 It was not until 1964 that the full
extent of danger from exposure to asbestos was clarified, at which
time not only asbestosis, but lung cancer and mesothelioma, were
acknowledged as substantial risks.27 Manville focuses on that date:
"Not until 1964 was it known that excessive exposure to asbestos
fiber released from asbestos-containing insulation products can sometimes cause certain lung diseases." 28 Beginning that year, Manville
took further steps to deal with the problem. It instituted the use of
warning labels on some asbestos products 29 and improved its dust
collecting apparatus.3 0 The company also continued its over twenty
year practice of x-raying its employees.31
Unfortunately, Manville's enhanced safety program was too late
to have any beneficial effect on those individuals who had already
suffered long term exposure to asbestos-particularly, Manville fac20. Id. at 16, col. 1.
21. Id. at 18, col. 2.
22.

1982, at
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Epstein, Manville: The Bankruptcy of Product Liability, REGULATION, Sept.-Oct.

14, 18.
Id.
Coplon, supra note 14, at 16, col. 1.
Id.
See Epstein, supra note 22, at 18.
See Id. at 18-19.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at D3, col. 1.
Coplon, supra note 14, at 16, col. 3.
Id. at 20, col. 4, at 21, col. 1.
See Id. at 16, col. 1.
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tory workers and their families. 2 Today's victims, who have also
contracted asbestos-related diseases, include government shipyard
workers exposed to the dust during World War II,11 employees of
other companies that utilized Manville's products,34 consumers who
used Manville's goods,35 and children who played in the company's
dump. 6
Victims suing Manville allege damage to their health due to asbestos fiber exposure, either during manufacturing operations utilizing asbestos or in the handling of products containing the mineral.3
Plaintiffs also allege that Manville neither provided adequate information concerning the health hazards of asbestos nor protected adequately against its dangers.3 8 The onrush of litigation, which began
in 1968,39 persisted until Manville filed for reorganization.
In its reorganization affidavit, Manville's treasurer, James Beasley, quoted statistical data for 1980, 1981, and the first half of 1982.
The statistics indicated that the number of lawsuits, initiated in various jurisdictions throughout the United States, had continually increased.40 These statistics also reflect the enormous costs incurred by
Manville to defend these suits.41 In addition, Beasley stated that as
of the filing of its reorganization petition, Manville had already been
found liable for punitive damages in ten asbestos-related actions.42
32. Not only have factory workers died from asbestos exposure, but so have nonfactory
employees such as a stock boy and management personnel. Id. at 19, col. 2.
33. Kelly, supra note 5, at 18.
34. Epstein, supra note 22, at 15.
35. For example, a 13 year old boy died of an asbestos-related disease after helping his
father fix automobile brakes. Coplon, supra note 14, at 19, col. 2.
36. Id.
37. Debtor's Affidavit, supra note 2, at 5.
38. N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at D4, col. 5.
39. Kelly, supra note 5, at 17.
40. By the end of 1980, there were 5087 cases brought by 9300 plaintiffs; by the end of
1981, there were 9300 cases brought by 12,800 plaintiffs; and by the end of the first half of
1982, there were approximately 11,000 cases brought by approximately 15,550 plaintiffs.
Debtor's Affidavit, supra note 2, at 5-6.
Monthly data was also reported: in 1980, there was an average of 365 new plaintiffs
instituting an average of 230 new cases each month; in 1981, there was an average of 560 new
plaintiffs instituting an average of 400 new cases each month; and during the first half of 1982,
there was an average of 495 new plaintiffs instituting an average of 425 new cases each month.
Id. at 5.
41. Average costs per claim, excluding legal expenses and court costs, in 1980, were
$22,710; in 1981, were $15,025; and in the first half of 1982, were $18,690. Noting several
pending cases as well, the average cost equalled $20,690 per claim. The inclusion of defense
expenses has increased the current cost of litigation to approximately $40,000 per case. Id. at
5-6.
42. Id. E.g., Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1982).
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These past and pending claims, as well as 32,000 anticipated
future claims, 43 compounded by insurance coverage battles," precipitated Manville's controversial decision to file for corporate reorganization under chapter 11 of the New Code. 5
The average punitive damage award is approximately $616,000 per case. Debtor's Affidavit, supra note 2, at 6.
43. See supra note 6. But see Martin Shubik's Affidavit in Support of Creditor's Motion
to Dismiss at 2, 5, 10, In re Johns-Manville Corp., Nos. 82 B 11656 to 82 B 11676 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 31, 1982). Professor Shubik, the Seymour H. Knox Professor of Mathematical Institutional Economics at Yale University, claims that:
[T]he application of statistical projections to demographic studies, health studies,
economic and social and political investigations is burdened with considerable
difficulties ...
Given [these] uncertainties
these uncertainties ...

. . .

their use in business calculations must reflect

.[T]he number of assumptions made by E.R.I. are so broad, and its sample
so small, as to deprive its estimates of 'credibility' ....
It is my opinion that the management of Manville is utilizing the bankruptcy
process as a strategic weapon to protect itself against unmanifested and, to a large
extent, hypothetical worst case contingencies, rather than as a societal means of
relief for proven misfortune. In doing so, the management is discriminating against
its various classes of creditors.
Finally, Dr. Irving J.Selikoff, chief of environmental health at Mount Sinai Hospital in
New York and an expert in the field of asbestos-related disease, believes Manville might be
underestimating the number of future claims. N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1982, at A13, col. 4.
For the purposes of this note, it is assumed that the E.R.I. statistics are sound. If Professor Shubik's conclusion was accepted at this time, Manville's projected financial crisis would
be averted, probably resulting in an early dismissal of the reorganization petition because of a
lack of good faith. Such a result would allow the courts to avoid addressing the critical issue of
whether a presently healthy corporation, laden with future monetary obligations which would
cause severe financial problems, could seek protection under the umbrella of the New Code.
44. Although Manville has insurance coverage which could indemnify the corporation in
these proceedings, the insurance companies have refused to pay based on differing interpretations of the insurance policies. See Debtor's Affidavit, supra note 2, at 7. While Manville
asserts that the insurers are liable for all policies in effect at the time of exposure, the insurance companies claim that their liabilities are limited to those policies now in effect.. Kelly,
supra note 5, at 17. Litigation has been pending in the Superior Court of the State of California for the City and County of San Francisco since March 1980. In re Asbestos Insurance
Coverage Cases, Nos. 1072 and 765226 (filed March 31, 1980). Debtor's Affidavit, supra note
2, at 7.
Manville has since sued the United States Government to recover damages paid to shipyard workers who contracted asbestos-related diseases. See Johns-Manville Corp. & JohnsManville Sales Corp. v. United States, No. 465-83 C (U.S. Cl. Ct. filed July 19, 1983). The
company claims that the government failed to assume responsibility for the health and safety
of those individuals. N.Y. Times, July 20, 1983, at DI, col. 1. Manville has also lobbied for
federal legislation which would hold the government partially responsible. Id.
45. See Debtor's Affidavit, supra note 2, at 7-8.
Although Manville's annual volume of business is approximately $2 billion, id. at 3, Beas-
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Believing reorganization to be the only viable solution to such a
devastating set of circumstances, Beasley asserted in the reorganization affidavit that:
Confronted with such potentially massive liabilities, Manville
would have no recourse except to sell, liquidate or otherwise dispose of assets and dismember its businesses in order to continue to
pay the costs of disposing of these suits. Not only would a point
soon be reached where future successful plaintiffs would be unable
to collect the amounts of their judgments or proposed settlements,
but all other creditors of Manville would likewise be confronted
with the stark realization that they too could not be paid nearly in
full.
Therefore, in order to treat all creditors of Manville evenhandedly, whether their claims at the present time be liquidated or
unliquidated, contingent or non-contingent, mature or unmatured,
Manville has reluctantly, but of necessity, deemed the filing of the
• . . chapter 11 petitions to be an economic imperative.
It is only through the financial reorganization provisions of
chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code that all claims against the
Debtors can be liquidated or estimated, and be treated within the
framework of a plan of reorganization that will realize more for
creditors than would a liquidation but yet will be consistent with
Manville's capacity to perform. It is thus Manville's intention to
formulate effective procedures to accomplish precisely that in a
manner which will not improperly favor any creditor over any other
creditor similarly situated, be consistent with the fundamental
bankruptcy tenet of equality of distribution and permit Manville to
and profitable business it has been and expects
emerge as the viable
4
to be once again. 6
Icy reported that the estimated financial burden of all asbestos-related litigation "could range
from anywhere between $2 billion to many times that amount over the next twenty years." Id.
at 7-8; see also supra note 43.
Of course, if Manville is permitted to remain a debtor in bankruptcy, others including
stockholders, lending institutions, and suppliers will also be affected. In fact, other creditors
have already been affected since § 362 of the New Code stays all suits against the debtor. See
H.R. REp. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 5963, 6296-97 [hereinafter cited as House Report] ("[The automatic stay] gives the
It permits the
debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all collection efforts ....
debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial
pressures that drove him into bankruptcy."). But see Costa Viva Homeowners Assoc. v. JohnsManville Corp., No. 82-5373 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 1982) (Bankruptcy Judge Lifland, in
an adversary proceeding, permitted an appeal involving Manville's exterior wall covering product to continue in a California court); Wall St. J., Dec. 28, 1982, at 17, col. 3.
46. Debtor's Affidavit, supra note 2, at 8-9.
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Opponents, however, vehemently object to Manville's use of the
bankruptcy system to satisfy its obligations.47 This note specifically
addresses the most controversial issue in the Manville dilemma:
whether or not Manville has filed its reorganization petition in good
faith.48
II.

THE APPROPRIATENESS OF MANVILLE'S REORGANIZATION
PETITION

A.

Is There a Good Faith Requirement?

Before undertaking an analysis of whether or not Manville filed
47. See newspaper articles cited supra note 5.
48. Three companies, Manville's co-defendants in thousands of asbestos-related tort
suits, challenged the reorganization petition on other grounds, asserting that the bankruptcy
court lacked jurisdiction over the Manville case. The United States Supreme Court refused to
halt the reorganization proceeding, despite the Court's recent decision that part of the current
bankruptcy law is unconstitutional. See In re Keene Corp., 103 S. Ct. 1237 (1983); Wall St.
J., Feb. 23, 1983, at 4, col. 3; see also N.Y. Times, May 24, 1983, at D5, col. 1.
Impetus for such a challenge stemmed from the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., majority; Rehnquist & O'Connor, JJ., concurring; Burger, C.J., White & Powell, JJ., dissenting). After filing a petition for reorganization in the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota, Northern Pipeline Construction
Co. ("Northern Pipeline") also filed suit against Marathon Pipe Line Co. ("Marathon") in
that same court, seeking damages for alleged breaches of contract and warranty, misrepresentation, coercion, and duress. Id. at 56. Marathon filed a motion to dismiss the suit on the
ground that the New Code unconstitutionally conferred article III judicial power upon judges
who lacked both life tenure and protection against salary diminution. Id. at 56-57. The bankruptcy court dismissed the motion, but on appeal, the district court reversed. 12 Bankr. 946
(D. Minn. 1981), rev'g 6 Bankr. 928 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980). On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, a divided Court held that Congress' broad jurisdictional grant of power to
non-tenured bankruptcy judges was violative of article III of the United States Constitution.
458 U.S. at 87. The relevant section held unconstitutional read as follows:
(a) Except as provided in . . .(b) . . .the district courts shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under [the New Code].
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a
court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have original
but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under [the New Code]
or arising in or related to cases under [the New Code].
(c) The bankruptcy court for the district in which a case under [the New Code] is
commenced shall exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred by this section on the
district courts.
28 U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. V 1981).
Due to its holding, the Court stated that the current bankruptcy judges could not constitutionally be vested with jurisdiction to decide Northern Pipeline's state law contract claim
against Marathon. 458 U.S. at 87 n.40. The Court, however, stayed its judgment until October
4, 1982, in order to provide "Congress an opportunity to reconstitute the bankruptcy courts or
to adopt other valid means of adjudication, without impairing the interim administration of the
bankruptcy laws." Id. at 88 (citations omitted).
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its reorganization petition in good faith, one must first determine
whether a debtor seeking reorganization under the New Code must,
in fact, file in good faith at all. The New Code is silent on a good
faith filing requirement.. Chapter 11 of the New Code is, however, a
consolidation of selected portions of the now repealed Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 (the "Old Act") .4 Those portions, corporate reorganization and arrangements chapters X, XI, and XII, were added to the
Old Act in 1938.50 Therefore, it is appropriate to examine the good
faith issue under the Old Act to ascertain its relevance in the New
Code. Only chapter X explicitly required that the debtor's reorganization petition be filed in good faith. Courts deciding current cases
under chapters XI and XII have, nevertheless, construed an implied
good faith filing requirement in those chapters. 2
Congress sought and obtained a second stay until December 24, 1982, United States v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 103 S. Ct. 200 (1982), but failed to pass corrective legislation prior
to the adjournment of the 97th Congress. Wall St. J., Dec. 22, 1982, at 6, col. 2. Anticipating
Congress' failure to act within the allotted time, the Judicial Conference of the United States
proposed an interim rule which would, if adopted, minimize the chaos and confusion that
would result in the absence of any orderly bankruptcy system. See White Motor Corp. v.
Citibank, 704 F.2d 254, 256 (6th Cir. 1983). Under the rule, the bankruptcy courts may still
adjudicate bankruptcy matters, but with significant involvement by the district courts. Id.
Each circuit has since adopted some variation of the rule. Id. The District Court for the Southem District of New York, the district where the Manville proceeding has been filed, adopted
its Emergency Bankruptcy Rule on December 21, 1982. S.D.N.Y. EMER. BANKR. R. I. The
interim rules are still in effect since the Supreme Court has denied Congress a third extension
to pass corrective legislation. United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 103 S. Ct. 662 (1982);
Wall St. J., Dec. 24, 1982, at 1, col. 6. Although the interim rules have provided some temporary relief, there is still uncertainty surrounding the nation's bankruptcy system. The determination of a case such as Manville, which depends in large part upon the resolution of state tort
claims, is hopelessly caught up in this intragovernmental branch confusion.
Opponents of Manville's reorganization petition object to the use of the bankruptcy courts
for resolution and ultimate determination of asbestos-related claims against Manville. They
challenge Manville's "filing, asserting that it is an abuse of the bankruptcy process. See N.Y.
Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at D4, col. 1. Therefore, even if Congress should ultimately decide to
afford bankruptcy judges article III powers, the issues raised by Manville's opponents must
still be addressed. This note focuses on those complaints and not on the constitutionality of the
current bankruptcy law.
49. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), amended by Act of June 22,
1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, repealedby Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101151,326 (1982).
50. Chapters X, XI, and XII comprised part of the Chandler Act Amendments. Ch.
575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938).
51. Old Act §§ 141, 146, 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 546 (1976).
52. E.g., In re Mallard Assoc., 475 F. Supp. 1045, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (chapter XII),
plan hearing,8 Bankr. 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see also In re Victory Constr. Co., 9 Bankr. 549,
557-58 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.) (an excellent examination of the good faith issue), stay granted
pending appeal, 9 Bankr. 570 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981).
The New Code is in effect for all cases brought on or after October 1, 1979; thus, all prior
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The next step in the analysis is to determine whether the New
Code's consolidation of the Old Act's chapters has preserved that
good faith prerequisite. Courts have overwhelmingly held that petitions filed under chapter 11 of the New Code must be filed in good
faith. 53 In their holdings, courts have focused on section 1112 of the
New Code 54 and have concluded that that section, which lists nine
reasons for a court to dismiss a debtor's reorganization petition, is
not all-inclusive. 55 Also central in their concerns have been comments in House and Senate Reports56 that the nine provisions enumerated in section 1112 are not exhaustive,57 as the Reports state
that the courts are empowered to "consider other factors as they
arise, and to use [their] equitable powers to reach an appropriate
result in individual cases." 58 Since bankruptcy courts are indeed
courts of equity, they may properly dismiss a petition to ensure that
cases are still governed by the Old Act. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. i27, 129 n.1 (1979).
53. E.g., In re Alton Tel. Printing Co., 14 Bankr. 238, 240 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1981); In re
Victory Constr. Co., 9 Bankr. 549, 558 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.), stay granted pending appeal, 9
Bankr. 570 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981); In re Nancant, Inc., 8 Bankr. 1005, 1007-08 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1981).
Interestingly, Judge Lifland, the bankruptcy judge in charge of the Manville case, questioned such a strict good faith requirement in an earlier decision:
[T]he Victory court held that good faith is an 'implicit prerequisite' to the filing and
continuation of a Chapter I ccase. . . . I cannot agree with so sweeping a holding.
Good faith as the sine qua non for the filing and maintenance of a Chapter 11 case
should be probed elastically and on a case by case basis. To do otherwise invites
unnecessary rigidity in bankruptcy administration emasculating bright prospects of
reorganization by slavish review of pre-petition dealings by debtors with their
creditors.
In determining a lack of good faith, the court should emphasize the intent to
abuse the judicial process rather than to delay creditors.
In re Eden Assocs., 13 Bankr. 578, 584 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (citation omitted).
54. 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (1982).
55. E.g., In re Century City, Inc., 8 Bankr. 25, 30 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980); In re Northwest Recreational Activities, Inc., 4 Bankr. 36, 39 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.), plan confirmation, 4
Bankr. 43 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
Prior to listing the nine examples for dismissal or conversion, § 1112(b) states: "[T]he
court may convert . . . or . . . dismiss a case . . . for cause, including ..
" 11 U.S.C. §
1112(b) (1982) (emphasis added). The word "including" is defined in § 102(3) as "not limiting." Id. § 102(3).
56. House Report, supra note 45, at 6362; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 117,
reprinted In 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5903 [hereinafter cited as Senate
Report].
57. See In re Nancant, Inc., 8 Bankr. 1005, 1006 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981) (quoting
House Report, supra note 45, at 6362 and Senate Report, supra note 56, at 5903); In re
Northwest Recreational Activities, Inc., 4 Bankr. 36, 39 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.) (quoting House
Report, supra note 45, at 6362), plan confirmation, 4 Bankr. 43 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
58. House Report, supra note 45, at 6362; Senate Report, supra note 56, at 5903.
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the purposes of the New Code are fulfilled. 9 Section 305 of the New
Code also enables a court to dismiss or suspend a case if "the interests of creditors and the debtor would be better served by such dismissal or suspension." 60 Moreover, a court may abstain from hearing
a particular proceeding of a case properly within its jurisdiction.e
Thus, once the requirement of good faith is read into the New Code,
the next step is to define that term and to ascertain whether or not
Manville's filing comports with that definition.
B. Good Faith Defined
1. Abuse of the Jurisdictionof the Bankruptcy Court.-Several
courts have held that to abuse the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court is equivalent to a lack of good faith.62 One oft-quoted decision
has held that:
[D]ismissal for lack of "good faith" as distinguished in the jurisdictional integrity sense ... is not precluded by the new Code. Good

faith, in the sense perceived by this court to have continued relevance, is merged into the power of the court to protect its jurisdictional integrity from schemes of improper petitioners seeking to circumvent jurisdictional restrictions and from petitioners with
demonstrable frivolous purposes absent any economic reality. 3
Examples of jurisdictional abuses are numerous and varied and
include: attempting to escape state court proceedings;" forming a
debtor solely to obtain an automatic stay of foreclosure; 5 transferring property from an ineligible entity to one able to utilize the
bankruptcy system in order to circumvent a foreclosure sale;66
shielding the assets of an investor's more affluent companies from the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court;67 forestalling tax liability by requesting such liability be determined in bankruptcy court without
any need for reorganization; 8 filing for reorganization with an ab59. E.g., In re Coram Graphic Arts, 11 Bankr. 641, 644-45 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
60. 11 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1) (1982).
61. 28 U.S.C § 1471(d) (Supp. V 1981).
62. See infra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
63. In re Northwest Recreational Activities, Inc., 4 Bankr. 36, 39 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.),
plan confirmation, 4 Bankr. 43 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
64. E.g., In re Cook, 104 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1939).
65. E.g., In re Zed, Inc., 9 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 223 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1982).
66. E.g., In re G-2 Realty Trust, 6 Bankr. 549 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980).
67. E.g., In re Eden Assocs., 13 Bankr. 578 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
68. E.g., In re Nancant, Inc., 8 Bankr. 1005 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981).
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sence of real debt and real creditors;69 and using the system solely to
recoup investment or obtain profit in lieu of foreclosure proceedings,70 solely to recapture property transferred pursuant to an agreement with creditors,7 1 or solely to frustrate enforcement of power of
sale provisions under a deed of trust. 2 Of the foregoing examples,
two require further analysis because of their relevance to the
Manville petition: attempting to escape state court proceedings and
filing for reorganization with an absence of real debt and real
creditors.
a. Attempts to Escape State Court Proceedings.-Two preCode decisions either mandate"3 or prefer 74 adjudication in state
courts to adjudication in the bankruptcy court system. Neither, however, appears to buttress Manville's opponents' claims that the reorganization petition should be dismissed."
In the first such decision, In re Cook,7 6 a committee representing bondholders of a foreclosed hotel was accused of misconduct.
The state court in charge of the proceedings removed the committee
members from the management of the property and ordered an accounting. 77 Ten days prior to the date of the accounting, the committee members filed a voluntary reorganization petition.7 8 The federal
court held that although the debtor filed its petition shortly before
the date of the accounting, that by itself, might not be conclusive of
a bad faith filing. This circumstance, however, coupled with the fact
that the debtor was neither insolvent 9 nor unable to pay its debts as
69.
70.
71.

E.g., In re Century City, Inc., 8 Bankr. 25 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980).
E.g., In re Alison Corp., 9 Bankr. 827 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981).
E.g., In re Century City, Inc., 8 Bankr. 25 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980).

72. E.g., In re Fast Food Properties, Ltd., 5 Bankr. 539 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1980).
73. In re Cook, 104 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1939).
74. Tucker v. Texas Am. Syndicate, 170 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1948), reformed and afid
sub nom. Tucker v. Baker, 185 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1950), modified on other grounds, 214 F.2d

627 (5th Cir. 1954).
75. E.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at D4, col. 1: "[A]sbestos claimants' lawyers...
think the bankruptcy courts are the wrong place to resolve [the asbestos] problem. They say it

is an abuse of the system to use the bankruptcy laws as a shield against litigation." But see
Creditors Committee for Asbestos-Related Property Damage School Claimants' Memorandum

of Law in Opposition to Dismissal and/or Abstention at 10, In re Johns-Manville Corp., Nos.
82 B 11656 to 82 B 11676 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 9, 1982) [hereinafter cited as School

Creditors]: "[The debtors] have not filed their petition in a sham attempt to avoid their responsibilities in litigation elsewhere."
76.

104 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1939).

77. Id. at 983.
78.

Id. at 983-84.

79. A debtor need not be insolvent under the New Code, see In re Century City, Inc., 8
Bankr. 25, 31 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980); see also The Chrysler CorporationFinancialSituation:
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they matured, mandated dismissal of the petition." The court held
that:
[T]he instant proceeding was instituted not for the purpose of obtaining benefits afforded by the Act to a corporation in financial
distress, but to enable [the debtors] to escape the jurisdiction of
another court where the day of reckoning for their alleged acts of
misconduct was at hand. . . Their conduct and the demonstrated

purpose of coming into the Federal Court was a fraud, not only
upon that court, but the State Court as well.81
In Tucker v. Texas American Syndicate,8 2 as in Cook, the court
believed that the debtor was not in need of bankruptcy protection."3
In Tucker, a diversified landowner and developer filed a voluntary
reorganization petition asserting an inability to pay its debts as they
mature. Prior to approving the petition, the lower federal court
stayed five suits that were pending in state court.8" On appeal, the
court of appeals dismissed the petition holding that the debtor was
not insolvent and had paid off debts not due in order to qualify as a
debtor unable to pay its current debts.8 5 The debtor also had sufficient assets which could be utilized to raise the monies needed to pay
off any and all of its financial obligations. While dismissing the petition for lack of good faith, the court also noted the impropriety of
granting the stays for the state court lawsuits.8 6 The court stated
that if it was "not a distinct disservice, at least it would be a work of
Hearings on H.R. 5805 Before the Subcomm. on Economic Stabilization of the House Comm.
on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979) (Professor Frank Kennedy, in his report, "The Impact of a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Proceeding on Chrysler Corporation," stated that: "It is no longer necessary for a petitioner for reorganization relief to allege
or show insolvency or inability to pay debts as they mature."). But see N.Y. Times, Sept. 1,
1982, at DI, col. 1, quoting Yale Law School Professor Joseph Bishop, Jr.:
'If I were the judge, I'd kick [Manville] out of bankruptcy court .... [T]he
odds are slightly in favor of some court, somewhere up the line, saying that the
bankruptcy petition is in error, because Manville is not insolvent.'
The Manville case will be the first test of whether insolvency is an implied
prerequisite of bankruptcy under the 1978 act ....
The New Code mentions insolvency or inability to meet one's debts as they mature only in
connection with a chapter 9 (Adjustment of Debts of a Municipality) proceeding. See 11
U.S.C. § 109(c)(3) (1982) ("Who may be a debtor").
80. See Cook, 104 F.2d at 985.
81. Id. (citation omitted).
82. 170 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1948), reformed and affd sub nom. Tucker v. Baker, 185
F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1950), modified on other grounds, 214 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1954).
83. See id. at 940.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 941.
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supererogation for the bankruptcy court to take all these [real estate] suits away from the state courts and try them in the federal
court."81
In both Cook and Tucker, the courts were not only convinced
that the debtor was not in need of financial rehabilitation, but that
each voluntary filing was an abuse of the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts. In Cook, the debtors' sole motive was to escape possible state court prosecution,88 while in Tucker, the debtor merely
sought relief from debts it could otherwise have paid. 9 Although it
is true that asbestos-related tort suits are traditionally state claims, 90
neither Cook nor Tucker mandate that a corporation truly in need of
financial rehabilitation may not utilize the federal bankruptcy system despite the fact that part of the debtor's financial troubles is due
to traditionally state-created claims.
This point is further supported by comparisons between the Old
Act's and the New Code's treatment of tort claims. In the Old Act,
92
1
in order for a claim to be discharged, it had to be both provable
and allowable.93 One recent case, decided under the Old Act, 94 held
that there were no provisions for tort claims under the Old Act and
thus such claims were not provable. 5 The New Code, however, has
abandoned the provability requirement.9 Similarly, it has altered
the standards for allowing claims. 7 The New Code now requires
that the bankruptcy court estimate any contingent or unliquidated
claim,98 whether or not such estimation will delay the administration
87. Id.
88. 104 F.2d at 985.
89. 170 F.2d at 940.
90. See infra note 102.
91. Old Act § 17, 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1976) (repealed 1978).
92. Id. § 63, 11 U.S.C. § 103.
93. Id. § 57, 11 U.S.C. § 93.
94. In re Magnavox Co., 627 F.2d 803 (7th Cir. 1980).
95. Id. at 805. But see Old Act § 63(a)(7), 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)(7) (damages for negligence could be proved and allowed if suit was instituted prior to and pending at the time of the
filing of the petition).
In any event, a contingent or unliquidated claim that was proved could be allowed only if
such claim was then liquidated or estimated and such liquidation or estimation would not
"unduly delay the administration of the estate or any proceeding under this Act." Id. § 57(d),
I I U.S.C. § 93(d). If a contingent or unliquidated claim has not been allowed as provided by §
57(d), then the claim shall not be deemed provable. Id. § 63(d), 11 U.S.C. § 103(d).
96. B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, supra note 7, at 5.01.
97. See Old Act §§ 57(d), 63(d), II U.S.C. §§ 93(d), 103(d); see also supra note 95.
98. II U.S.C. § 502(c)(1) (1982); B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, supra note 7, at 1
5.05[4]. One notewriter suggests that the bankruptcy court only estimate Manville's total asbestos-related liability and permit other courts to estimate each individual asbestos-related
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of the estate, 99 thus resulting in the discharge of those claims. 10 0 If
Manville is successful in proving that it is, in fact, in need of
financial reorganization-even though such need is due to asbestosrelated tort claims-its refuge in the bankruptcy system is not an
abuse of the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts per se. There
seems to be little distinction in this regard between a debtor in
financial distress due to conventional business misfortunes seeking
discharge of a single tort claim, and a debtor in financial distress due
entirely to tort claims seeking discharge of those claims. Therefore,
since tort claims are now dischargeable under the New Code,101 once

a debtor has successfully shown financial despair, opponents cannot
argue simply that a company such as Manville is, prima facie, abusing the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts merely because its debts
02
are tortious in nature.2

This conclusion finds further support in the recent In re Alton
Telegraph Printing Co. decision.1 0 3 In that case, the debtor news-

paper filed a chapter 11 petition for reorganization. The bankruptcy
court noted that the debtor would not have been involved in the
bankruptcy proceeding "if it were not for the libel judgment obtained by [the opposing creditor], as well as other very substantial
libel claims currently pending against it."' 4 Although bankruptcy

relief was sought solely because of those tort claims, the court held
that the debtor was eligible for relief under the New Code and that

the petition was filed in good faith.' 05
claim. Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1128-29 (1983).
99. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(1) (1982) and B. W iNarTAuB & A. RESNICK, supra
note 7, at 5.05[4] with Old Act § 57, 11 U.S.C. § 93 and supra note 95. The court may,
however, abstain from hearing part of the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(d) (Supp. V 1981); see
supra text accompanying note 61.
100. 11 U.S.C. § 524 ("Effect of discharge") (1982); id. § 1141(d) (the discharge effect
of plan confirmation); see In re Magnavox Co., 627 F.2d 803, 805 n.5 (7th Cir. 1980).
101. In re Magnavox Co., 627 F.2d 803, 805 n.5 (7th Cir. 1980).
102. Robert J. Rosenberg, an attorney representing asbestosis plaintiffs, believes that
"the company should have faced the alleged victims in the state courts." Wall St. J., Dec. 24,
1982, at 1, col. 6. But see School Creditors, supra note 75, at 10: "[The debtors] have not filed
their petition in a sham attempt to avoid their responsibilities. . . .";see also Newsday, Nov.
11, 1982, at 47, col. 1 (reporting the comments of Senator Robert Dole, Chairman of the
Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts): "At first glance, the filing by the Manville Corp. seemed
'dubious and unusual' . . . .But he said closer analysis led him to the conclusion that bankruptcy action, 'at least in Manville's case, could [give] certain significant'advantages, not only
to Manville, but also to asbestos victims.' ").
103. 14 Bankr. 238 (Bankr. S.D. I1. 1981).
104. Id. at 241.
105. Id.
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b. Absence of Debt and Creditors.-The other pertinent example of jurisdictional abuse is filing for reorganization with an absence
of real debt and real creditors. Opponents of the Manville filing
stated their respective challenges to the petition claiming: (1) absence of real debtors; (2) absence of real debt; and (3) absence of
real creditors. 108 Since these three objections are so tightly interwoven, significant individual analysis is impractical, although some specific observations can be made. It has already been established that
insolvency, or the inability of a debtor to pay its debts as they become due, is not a requirement for an entity filing a reorganization
petition under chapter 11.107 One must ascertain, therefore, whether
Manville's current financial position warrants bankruptcy protection.
If so, Manville could be an appropriate debtor. The biggest obstacle
facing Manville, however, is whether those estimated 32,000 individuals previously exposed to asbestos, 10 8 but not yet ill--or more specifically, not yet aware of their illness-can be presently considered
creditors with claims against the Manville Corporation. If not, one
could argue that Manville is financially able to handle all of its current asbestos-related liabilities without the need of reorganization.
Conversely, if these potential plaintiffs can be classified as present
claimants, then Manville would be entitled to the protection afforded
by the bankruptcy system for an entity in financial distress.
Analysis must therefore begin with the determination of the status of those individuals not yet ill. The New Code defines creditor, in
part, as an "entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose 1at
09
the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor,"
and defines claim, in part, as a "right to payment, whether or not
such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured."11 0 There is little question that future asbestosis victims will ultimately have claims against Manville. The
problem, however, is whether these individuals have claims against
106.

See, e.g., M.J. Whitman & Co.'s Motion to Dismiss at 1, In re Johns-Manville

Corp., Nos. 82 B 11656 to 82 B 11676 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 1, 1982).
107. See supra note 79.
108. See supra note 6.
109. 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A) (1982). The filing of the petition in a voluntary case constitutes the order for relief. Id. § 301.
110. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1982). Those asbestosis victims who have already received
judgments, were in the process of litigating their lawsuits, or were ready to proceed against
Manville are all statutory creditors because their claims have certainly arisen "before the order for relief concerning the debtor."
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the debtor which arose at the time Manville filed its bankruptcy
petition.111
Although not addressing this point directly, the legislative history, on its face, cannot be construed to deny creditor status to those

exposed to asbestos but not yet ill. The legislative reports note that
the term "claim" in the New Code is broader in scope than it was in
the Old Act. 12 In fact, it was intended to be given the broadest definition possible: "The bill contemplates that all legal obligations of
the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be able to be

dealt with in the bankruptcy case. It permits the broadest possible
relief in the bankruptcy court."113 Therefore, awarding potential asbestosis victims creditor status with present claims is not precluded
by the New Code. 1 4

In determining whether potential victims are claimants, the
Manville court may focus on the treatment accorded asbestos-related
111. Both UNR Industries and Amatex Corporation are faced with similar problems.
See supra note 5.In two decisions addressing requests by those debtors for the appointment of
either a legal representative, In re UNR Indus., 29 Bankr. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983), or a guardian
ad litem, In re Amatex Corp., 30 Bankr. 309 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) (recommendation to the
district court), to represent potential asbestosis victims, both courts denied the debtors' requests, UNR, 29 Bankr. at 748; Amatex, 30 Bankr. at 315-16, reasoning that those individuals
had no claims cognizable under the New Code. UNR, 29 Bankr. at 745, 746; Amatex, 30
Bankr. at. 315-16. Both decisions are being appealed. UNR, appeal docketed, No. 83-1746
(7th Cir. Apr. 26, 1983); Amatex, appeal docketed, No. 83-1843 (3d Cir. Nov. 18, 1983).
It is relevant to note, however, that in Amatex, the debtor had stipulated to one witness'
opinion that no jurisdiction would recognize a cause of action for asbestos-related disease until
the symptoms of the disease had manifested themselves. 30 Bankr. at 311. Since the court
relied on this stipulated testimony to reach its conclusion, id. at 315, and since various jurisdictions will recognize tort claims prior to manifestation, see infra text accompanying notes 11827, the court's opinion is of minimal persuasion regarding the issue of whether or not future
victims are creditors with cognizable claims.
It is also important to note the procedural history of these opinions: Both stem from applications of appointment, not from the basic question of whether or not future victims could be
labeled creditors.
For further discussion of the surrogate representation issue, see infra notes 153-57 and
accompanying text.
Federal District Judge Edelstein, currently involved in the Manville case, is insisting that
future unknown asbestosis victims be included in the reorganization plan. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26,
1983, at DI, col. 1. For further discussion of Judge Edelstein's role and his proposals in the
Manville case, see infra note 220.
112. House Report, supra note 45, at 6266; Senate Report, supra note 56, at 5807-08.
113. House Report, supra note 45, at 6266; Senate Report, supra note 56, at 5808.
114. It is not suggested that the legislators anticipated a situation where an otherwise
viable corporation, such as Manville, wrought with potentially devastating tort claims, would
seek the protection of the bankruptcy courts. This notewriter, however, suggests that the broad
language and intent of the New Code would permit such a distressed entity to avail itself of
the protection of the bankruptcy courts.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1983

17

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LAW RE VIEW

[Vol. 12:121

tort claims under applicable state law. Although bankruptcy courts
were established pursuant to article I of the United States Constitution as federal courts to assume original and exclusive jurisdiction
over bankruptcy cases115 and, therefore, are not bound by state
law,116 bankruptcy courts have, in the past, looked to state law for
guidance. For example, bankruptcy courts have focused on state law
in determining the origin and existence of a claim.117 Thus, the
bankruptcy court handling the Manville petition will be faced with
several state legal theories regarding the accrual of an asbestos-related tort claim. These state law theories are integrally related to the
"door-closing" statute of limitations defense available to defendants
in asbestos-related tort claims. The time at which a state's statute of
limitations begins to toll should indicate when a state-created claim
accrues. States have chosen a variety of formulas for determining
this crucial time period, 1 8 for example: time of the initial harmful
contact;11' time of last exposure;120 time when the medical condition
115.

§ 8, cl. 4.

In re Bowers, 16 Bankr. 298, 302 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); see U.S. CoNs.

art. I,

116. In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1982) (although state law required payment of
a mortgage in its entirety when accelerated, the court held a debtor could cure default under
the New Code); In re Spanish Trails Lanes, Inc., 16 Bankr. 304 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1981) (although an unlicensed contractor could not sue in state court, he had an actionable claim in
bankruptcy court); In re Bowers, 16 Bankr. 298 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (although the corporation's claim against the debtor would be unenforceable in state court because of failure to
obtain a certificate of authority, the corporation had a valid claim in bankruptcy court); In re
Lewis, 17 Bankr. 341, 342 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (state court finding of "willful and malicious" behavior is not binding on bankruptcy court). It is interesting to note that although the
New Code excepts from discharge any debt for "willful and malicious" injury by an individual
debtor, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1982), a corporation is not an individual, compare id. §
101(24) (" 'individual with regular income' ") with id. § 101(30) (" 'person' "). Thus, even if
Manville's actions were found to be "willful and malicious," no exception to discharge would
result.
117. E.g., In re Spanish Trails Lanes, Inc., 16 Bankr. 304, 306 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1981)
("The bankruptcy court in determining which claims are allowable should look to state law in
determining the origin and existence of a claim; however, after this initial determination is
made, state law is no longer controlling and the court is free to use its equitable powers in
allowing or disallowing a claim.");/n re Bowers, 16 Bankr. 298, 302 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981)
("State law is utilized only to determine if the creditor holds a claim, not how and what claims
shall be allowed."); In re Grosso, 9 Bankr. 815, 821 n.3 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1981) ("The question

. . .

when a state-created cause of action accrues . . . [is] governed by state law.").

118. See, e.g., Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 115-16 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (noting the different formulas utilized by various jurisdictions).
Due to the inherent vagueness of these formulations, it is unclear whether some of these
verbally distinct standards are, in fact, different.
119. See Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 1010, 430 N.E.2d 1297,
1299, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244, 246 (" 'the cause of action accrued at the time of invasion of [the
plaintiff's] body' ") (quoting Thorton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780, 781, 391 N.E.2d
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begins; 121 time when the disease was medically diagnosable; 122 time
when the plaintiff knows, or by reasonable diligence should know,
that he has the disease;123 time when the plaintiff knows, or by reasonable diligence should know, of the injury and that the injury was
caused by the wrongful act of another; 24 time when the plaintiff
knows, or by reasonable diligence should know, of the injury and
that the defendant has caused it; 25 or time when the disease
manifests itself.' 26 In addition, shipyard 'Workers have been successful in having courts apply federal maritime law, which requires the
defendant to show, as an affirmative defense, the plaintiff's unjustifi27
able delay in bringing the suit.
These various formulas present some interesting scenarios when
applied to the Manville case. Manville, as both a tort defendant and
debtor, would obviously prefer those jurisdictions that recognize a
claim at the earliest possible time; as a tort defendant, because a

plaintiff's suit may be time-barred by the statute of limitations and,
as a debtor, so that the origin of the claim would have occurred prior
to the time of Manville's petition. Potential asbestosis victims, on the
1002, 1003, 417 N.Y.S.2d 920, 921 (1979)), remittiturreturned, 55 N.Y.2d 802, 432 N.E.2d
139, 447 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1981), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 456 U.S. 967 (1982).
120. Braswell v. Flintkote Mines, Ltd., No. 82-2699 (7th Cir. Dec. 6, 1983) (available
Jan. 8, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir file). The court, construing Indiana law, held that
"the causes of action herein accrued when plaintiffs were last exposed to the asbestos." Id.;
Pauley v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 759, 761 (S.D. W. Va. 1981) (summarizing
various formulas used by several states, including West Virginia). The federal district court in
Pauley, a diversity action, refused to follow its interpretation of West Virginia law, see Scott v.
Rinehart & Dennis Co., 116 W. Va. 319, 180 S.E. 276 (1935), that an action accrues at the
time of last exposure. Although Scott has never been overruled, the Pauley court believed that
the highest state court would not rely on that decision.
121. See Large v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 524 F. Supp. 285, 287 (E.D. Va. 1981) (following
Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 275 S.E.2d 900 (1981)).
122. Neubauer v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 686 F.2d 570, 577 (7th Cir. 1982)
(applying Wisconsin law), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1233 (1983).
123. Pauley v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 759, 764 (S.D. W. Va. 1981) (citing Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973)) (summarizing various
formulas).
124. See Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos & Magnesia Materials Co., 85 Il1. 2d 161,
421 N.E.2d 864 (1981).
125. Pauley v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 759, 764 (S.D.W. Va. 1981) (citations omitted) (summarizing various formulas).
126. See id. (citing Uric v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949) and Karjala v. JohnsManville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975)) (summarizing various formulas).
One court has explicitly held that the "time to commence litigation does not begin to run
on a separate and distinct disease until that disease becomes manifest." Wilson v. JohnsManville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (emphasis added).
127. See White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 234, 240 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1983

19

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:121

other hand, would prefer to apply those state laws under which the
cause of action does not accrue until the latest possible date. The
latter approach would accomplish two goals: First, these potential
victims might not be considered creditors for the purpose of the
either in the petition's dismissal or the
debtor's petition, resulting
"nondischargeability"' 12 8 of their potential future claims; 129 and second, their traditional tort claims are less likely to be barred by a
state's statute of limitations. One problem arises, however, for those
individuals who were exposed to asbestos years earlier, but are currently unaware of their condition, and who might be time-barred be1 30
cause of their states' restrictive statute of limitations policies.
These individuals might conceivably opt for creditor status as the
only means of compensation.1 31
128. The word "nondischargeability" may be inappropriate because if they have no
claims, they will not need to defend the nondischargeable status of their claims.
129. This would, of course, be a gamble. Those victims who will eventually have claims
against Manville, although some time in the future, are assuming that Manville will be in
existence at that time and will be able to compensate them for their injuries via traditional
state court remedies. The risk, however, is that Manville will have been liquidated and there
will be no source from which these victims could recover.
130. Although some bankruptcy cases have not followed state law, see cases cited supra
note 116, other cases support the use of that route, see cases cited supra note 117. One case,
however, mandates that the state's statute of limitations be followed: "The question (1) when a
state-created cause of action accrues or (2) how long the applicable limitations period ought to
be, are governed by state law." In re Grosso, 9 Bankr. 815, 821 n.3 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1981).
131. It is possible, however, that such a creditor would be precluded from exercising that
option due to the statute of limitations bar. The New Code states that if a party in interest
objects to a claim, that claim will be "unenforceable against the debtor ... under any...
applicable law for a reason other than because such claim is contingent or unmatured." 11
U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (1982).
Since § 502(b)(1) of the New Code requires a party to object, however, it is conceivable
that Manville would choose not to do so; especially, if its objection would decrease the number
of creditors it deemed necessary to be considered an entity in financial despair. Manville could,
if necessary, explain its refusal to raise the statute of limitations affirmative defense-it would
not only be extremely costly to investigate the status of each individual potential claim,
thereby reducing the amount available for satisfaction of its debts, but it would be quite timeconsuming, frustrating a basic tenet of bankruptcy policy: namely, the "efficient, final resolution of claims." See infra note 170 and accompanying text. This does not appear to preclude,
however, the use of the defense by the abestosis victims who would be eligible for state court
relief and, therefore, have a vested interest in the dismissal of the Manville case. Such plaintiffs could litigate their pending cases, file "ripe" cases, or recover the full amount of any prior
judgment without having to share recovery with otherwise time-barred plaintiffs. Cf. In re
Toledo, 17 Bankr. 914, 917 (D.P.R. 1982) (trustee as party in interest may use any defenses
available to the debtor). Of course, state legislatures might choose to amend their statutes of
limitations policies as they pertain to asbestos-related injury because of the extensive latency
period of asbestos-related illness. See supra text accompanying note 9.
This notewriter recognizes the problem of affording those individuals relief through the
bankruptcy process who would otherwise be denied the possibility of relief, as compared with
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The greatest friction between Manville and potential asbestosis

victims arises in relation to the state laws which are most lenient to
asbestosis victims. Manville would like the bankruptcy court to consider those individuals creditors, with claims against the debtor
which arose at the time of the bankruptcy petition, while those victims appear most eager to resolve their claims against Manville in
the traditional state court fashion. The bankruptcy court is left sifting through these state laws, considering each state's definition of

the origin of a claim. If it should reject state definitions, the court
may establish a definition of its own.'3 2 The definition selected will
ultimately affect the breadth of the Manville reorganization or possibly preclude bankruptcy relief entirely. 3
The bankruptcy court will probably examine previous deci13 4
sions to help it decide whether to afford creditor status to some or
all of the potentially ill individuals. One of Manville's business credi-

tors, in its motion to dismiss the reorganization petition, relied on In
re Gladding Corp.,'3 5 a pre-Code decision, to buttress its position.131

those litigants who have already filed tort claims against Manville and have been barred by
their states' statutes of limitations. This dilemma, however, is beyond the scope of this note
and will not be discussed further.
132. See cases cited supra note 116. But see cases cited supra note 117.
133. If the bankruptcy court deems that a claim arises upon exposure, then Manville's
position that it will not be able to satisfy such claims has merit. If, on the other hand, the
court opts for a showing of manifestation, the pool of creditors will, of course, be lessened.
Such a reduced pool of creditors, when compounded with general business debts as well as
asbestos-related obligations to other creditors (including school districts, tort claimants with
judgments, and those whose cases are pending) may, nevertheless, enable Manville to demonstrate financial distress. Requiring manifestation, however, would cause future financial uncertainty and would seriously impair Manville's chances for a successful reorganization.
134. E.g., In re Amatex Corp., 30 Bankr. 309 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983), appeal docketed,
No. 83-1843 (3d Cir. Nov. 18, 1983); In re UNR Indus., 29 Bankr. 741 (N.D. I1. 1983),
appeal docketed, No. 83-1746 (7th Cir. Apr. 26, 1983).
135. 20 Bankr. 566 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982).
136. M.J. Whitman & Co.'s Memorandum of Law In Support of Its Motion to Dismiss
the Petition at 10-11, In re Johns-Manville Corp., Nos. 82 B 11656 to 82 B 11676 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Whitman & Co.].
The Committee of Asbestos-Related Litigants and/or Creditors filed its memorandum of
law and supporting affidavits seeking dismissal on November 14, 1983. The Committee alleges,
inter alia, that Manville was aware of, and concealed, the health hazards of asbestos, engaged
in fraudulent accounting practices, and possessed the ability to pay its asbestos-related tort
obligations, as they mature, in the ordinary course of business. Furthermore, the Committee
argues that the recently submitted plan violates the constitutional rights of future asbestosis
victims and eliminates their right to trial by jury. Therefore, they conclude that the Manville
reorganization should be dismissed. Memorandum of Law of the Committee of Asbestos-Related Litigants and/or Creditors in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Manville Chapter 11
Petitions, Henderson and Levy Affidavits in Further Support of Asbestos Committee's Motion
to Dismiss Manville's Bankruptcy Petitions, In re Johns-Manville Corp., Nos. 82 B 11656 to
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The Gladdingdebtor, a recreational vehicle manufacturer, sold a vehicle to CEF Enterprises ("CEF") in 1975, which was subsequently
sold to Mr. and Mrs. Coomes. In 1977, the debtor filed a chapter XI
petition and its plan of arrangement was confirmed in 1978.117 In
1979, the Coomes' sued CEF alleging a defect in the vehicle and, in
1980, CEF impleaded the debtor.13 8 The debtor argued that CEF's
claim was provable 139 and allowable, and was, therefore, already discharged in the prior plan confirmation. The court, however, held that
the claim "was so remote at the time of confirmation as to render it
incapable of proof. ' 140 Defining a contingent claim as "one which,
either as to its existence or as to its amount, depends upon some
future event uncertain either as to its occurrence altogether, or as to
the time of its occurrence, ' '141 the court suggested that Congress
probably did not "intend to declare a debt provable on the sole
ground that it is contingent. The proper construction of § 63a(8)
[contingent debts and contingent contractual liabilities] . . . necessitates its limitation to the contingent claims that are in their nature
provable.1 142 Although the court labels the debtor's obligation to
CEF at the time of the confirmation as a "mere possibility of a claim
of unknown origin, in an unknown amount, and which only might
arise, if at all, at some unknown time," 143 the claim was not dishave
charged because "at the time required for proof, [it] would
144
allowance."
its
prohibit
to
as
proof
of
been so incapable
Gladding was decided under the Old Act, with its statutory
provability requirement. Although the New Code, governing
Manville, has abandoned such a requirement, that is only one distinguishing feature between the two cases. Of greater significance is the
legislature's explicit intent, upon enacting the New Code, to broaden
the scope of relief available to the debtor.145 Thus, while Gladding's
precise facts, if placed in the context of a current chapter 11 reorganization might not mandate discharge, neither should Manville's
82 B 11676 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 14, 1983).

137. Gladding, 20 Bankr. at 567.
138. Id.
139. The New Code has dispensed with the provability requirement. See supra text accompanying note 96.
140. Gladding, 20 Bankr. at 567.
141. Id. (quoting 3A COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 63.30 (14th ed. 1978)).
142.

Id. at 567-68 (quoting COLLIER, supra note 141, at

143.

Id. at 568 (emphasis added).
Id. (citation omitted).

144.
145.

63.30).

See supra text accompanying note 113.
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unique facts preclude discharge.
Furthermore, the applicability of Gladding to the Manville reorganization is also narrowed by the different and unique factual setting of the Manville case. For example, in Gladding, the opinion
does not state the reason why the debtor sought relief, although it is
known that it was not due to CEF's claim, since that claim was presumably not listed and a plan had previously been confirmed. In the
Manville case, the debtor has filed because of its future liabilities
and without their inclusion there will be arguably no reorganization
at all. In addition, Gladding was not at the filing stage, but as previously mentioned, past confirmation. It would appear that if CEF's
claim was adjudicated discharged, CEF might not have been entitled
to share in the already agreed upon plan, because it had not filed a
proof of claim before confirmation. 146 Assuming arguendo that the
potential asbestosis victims could surmount the inherent difficulties
they face in the submission of their claims, 47 the controversy surrounding the inclusion or exclusion of potential asbestosis victims as
creditors has occurred at the filing stage and, as a result, these individuals would not be statutorily precluded from sharing in any
agreed upon plan.
Finally, the Gladding court concluded its decision by stating
that:
If the court were to adopt the debtor's argument, every retailer and
consumer who purchases an item from a manufacturer prior to the
bankruptcy of the manufacturer, would then be compelled to file in
the bankruptcy proceeding a proof of claim for some as yet unknown and undetermined
possibility of damage. Such a procedure
148
would be absurd.
This argument may have validity for Gladding's facts, but is, nevertheless, inapplicable to the Manville situation. Those individuals exposed to asbestos have a strong possibility-or probability, if statistics are accurate-of damage, the origin of which is, in fact, known
(exposure), and the effects of which can be determined (i.e., asbestosis, mesothelioma, or lung cancer). It is, therefore, reasonable for
Manville to include these victims in its reorganization scheme.
Somewhat analogous to the potential asbestosis victims are
146. Old Act § 355, 11 U.S.C. § 755a (1976) (repealed 1978). Potential asbestosis victims must also file a proof of claim. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
147. See infra notes 159, 182-84, 186 and accompanying text.
148.

Gladding, 20 Bankr. at 568 (emphasis in original).
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those warranty-holders whose warranties have not yet expired and
whose products have remained undamaged. Although such warrantyholders would appear to be creditors of the manufacturer/retailer
because of contractual obligations,149 treatment of their claims in a
reorganization poses similar problems to those of the potential asbestosis victims. For example, the contingent warranty-holder may not
realize the importance of protecting his interest, 15 0 while the potential asbestosis victim may not even realize he has any interest to protect. The latter situation could occur for several reasons: The individual could be or feel quite healthy, have been only slightly exposed,
be a family member of one who was exposed, or not even know he is
at risk. In any event, both contingent warranty-holders and potential
asbestosis victims would be required to file proofs of claim 15 " in order
to partake in any reorganization plan.15 2 It is apparent that this set
of circumstances creates problems for both groups. One suggestion,
offered in the warranty context, is the use of public interest groups
to intervene on behalf of the contingent warranty-holders.15 3 With
149. See Note, Consumer Warranty Claims Against Companies in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REF.347, 352 (1981) (the notewriter states that warranty-holders
are, in fact, creditors).
150. Id.
151. See 11 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (1982).
152. See B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, supra note 7, at 1 5.04.
153. Note, supra note 149, at 365.
UNR Industries ("UNR") and Amatex Corporation ("Amatex"), who are also both attempting reorganization because of asbestos-related claims, see supra notes 5 and 111, had
requested the appointment of a legal representative or a guardian ad litem to help deal with
the complex issue of unknown, future asbestosis victims. UNR claimed that a court-appointed
representative would aid in its reorganization as well as assure adequate representation for
those as-yet-unknown claimants. See In re UNR Indus., 29 Bankr. 741, 743-44 (N.D. Ill.
1983), appeal docketed, No. 83-1746 (7th Cir. Apr. 26, 1983). Both UNR and Amatex believed that such legal representation would aid the court in identifying this class of creditors
and in assuring that adequate notice is given. See id.; In re Amatex Corp., 30 Bankr. 309, 31011 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983), appeal docketed, No. 83-1843 (3d Cir. Nov. 18, 1983); Olick,
Chapter IlI-Panaceaor PerilIn Toxic Tort Cases, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 23, 1983, at 1, col. 4, at 6,
col. 4. For further discussion of the issue of notice, see infra text accompanying notes 163-87.
The United States Trustee in the UNR case requested that an amicus curiae be appointed to
advise the court on, among other issues, the number and identity of these future claimants
before considering the appointment of a legal representative. The amicus curiae could aid the
court in resolving questions of standing and representation. See UNR, 29 Bankr. at 744. The
Trustee also suggested a guardian ad litem be appointed. Id. at 744 n.3; see Olick, supra, at 6,
col. 4-5. Both courts, however, denied all such requests. Amatex, 30 Bankr. at 315-16 (recommendation to district court); UNR, 29 Bankr. at 744 & n.3, 747.
Manville has proposed several alternatives. On February 4, 1983, it asked the court to
estimate the monetary amount of all pending and unfiled asbestos-related claims. The estimate
could be ascertained by considering actuarial and statistical data, economic issues, and relevant historical-claim and litigation records. Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 1983, at 16, col. 4. For further
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discussion of the procedural history of this issue, see infra note 220.
On May 12, 1983, Manville suggested that the asbestosis victims accept either a "nofault" compensation system, receiving awards based on each claimant's specific physical injuries or, if such a proposal is rejected, have the bankruptcy court impose a settlement. Under
either plan, Manville requested that no punitive damages be awarded. See infra note 223 and
accompanying text. Manville also suggested that a "spin-off" company be formed and that
such company be free from all asbestos liability. Wall St. J, May 13, 1983, at 2, col. 2.
The next proposal, one week later, reiterated the corporate "spin-off" idea, with the new
company contributing some of its earnings to a fund designed to compensate the asbestos
claimants. Neither the "no-fault" nor the settlement procedure was included in this plan. It
was reported, however, that unless there is to be a "global plan" whereby the entire asbestos
industry contributes to the fund, litigation would continue for years. N.Y. Times, May 18,
1983, at DI, col. 1.
Manville's next proposal, which it had planned to submit on October 17, 1983, met with
considerable opposition. That plan provided for the creation of two distinct entities-M-One
and M-Two. M-One would be responsible for all asbestos-related liability while M-Two, insulated from such liability, would continue the corporation's business operations and utilize its
profits to satisfy Manville's debts. N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1983, at D7, col. 1. Negotiations were
focusing upon, among other things, how the money in the plan would pass to asbestosis victims. In this proposal, a "no-fault" system whereby victims would submit their claims and
receive a set amount for that degree of injury was again suggested. Some opponents, however,
believe that this procedure is unworkable because it fails to deal adequately with individual
cases and interferes with contingency fee arrangements between victims and their attorneys.
Id. Furthermore, no procedure had been evolved to deal with future asbestosis victims. Id.
Federal District Judge Edelstein, who is currently involved in the Manville case, has suggested
the implementation of a 20-year sinking fund to pay those future claimants. For a further
discussion of Judge Edelstein's role and his proposals in the Manville case, see infra note 220.
On October 27, 1983, Manville submitted another plan, which was in many ways similar
to the October 17th proposal, but Bankruptcy Judge Lifland refused to accept it. That plan
specifically requested that the asbestos lawyers' fees be sharply reduced. Wall St. J., Oct. 28,
1983, at 60, col. 2. Manville had, months earlier, offered $400 million to settle the asbestos
claims, but the attorneys rejected that offer. They instead requested more than $700 million.
That figure would approximate the contingency fees due the attorneys, leaving a balance of
$400 million to the victims. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, at D3, col. 6.
Also, on October 27, James Vermeulen, a former Manville employee with asbestosis and
executive director of the Asbestos Victims of America, criticized the attorneys in the case. He
complained to Judge Lifland that "'[i]n all these months, I have not been apprised of what's
going on . . . .'" Id. Judge Lifland suggested that Mr. Vermeulen sit on the creditors' committee. Id. The judge recommended that the victims themselves take a more active role in the
negotiations. Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1983, at 60, col. 2. He also told Mr. Vermeulen that he was
more sympathetic to the plight of the asbestos victims than any other party in the Manville
case. Id.
Manville filed its reorganization plan on November 21, 1983. Although the plan must be
approved by creditors and the court, Manville has requested an April 30, 1984 deadline in
order to gain support for its plan. N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1983, at D15, col. 1. The plan, in
essence, sets forth specific monetary amounts for specific illnesses and allows for additional
compensation in certain individual cases. Claimants, who are dissatisfied with the determination of the severity of their illness, could appeal their award to a court-appointed medical
panel. Id. Manville has again requested that contingency-fee arrangements between claimants
and their attorneys be voided and replaced by a system based upon hours worked and services
rendered. The plan reiterates the M-One and M-Two proposal. Id.
The asbestosis victims' attorneys question the constitutionality of the plan and have re-
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the court's permission,"" a public interest group could sit on a creditor's committee and represent the interests of a particular class of
creditors. Although a public interest group is not, in fact, a creditor,
bankruptcy courts have become more flexible regarding the composition of creditors' committeese" and may allow for public interest
representation. 56
If the bankruptcy court should award potential asbestosis victims creditor status, they also could receive committee representation, either directly or indirectly through public interest intervention.
Representation would be crucial, particularly due to the special circumstances surrounding their claims.157
i. Constitutional Issues.-The issue as to whether or not to
award potential asbestosis victims creditor status is further complicated by constitutional arguments. The three critical points emphasized by Manville's opponents are: (1) that potential victims cannot
receive adequate notice informing them of any aspect of the reorganization;158 (2) that these potential victims will be unable to comply
with section 1111 (a) of the New Code1 59 requiring that all contingent claims be filed; 160 and (3) that these potential victims cannot
adequately participate in the acceptance or rejection of any reorganization plan.' 6 ' Opponents, therefore, conclude that potential asbestoquested that the bankruptcy court allow other parties in the case to submit alternate proposals.
These attorneys continue to seek dismissal of the Manville reorganization. Id. For further
discussion of dismissal proceedings, see infra note 220. The asbestosis claimants' attorneys are
also considering a motion to liquidate part of Manville as well as a means to replace current
management. Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1983, at 60, col. 2.
Bankruptcy Judge Lifland "expressed disappointment" that Manville and its creditors
could not negotiate a consensual reorganization plan and fears that the bankruptcy will be
hindered by years of litigation. He further stated that the asbestosis victims "'will still be
sitting years from now waiting for dollar one.'" N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1983, at D15, col. 1.
154. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a),(b) (1982).
155. Note, supra note 149, at 357 n.47 (citing In re Schatz Fed. Bearings Co., 5 Bankr.
543 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980)) (collective bargaining agreement between the debtor and the
union made the union a creditor, authorizing its appointment to the Creditor Committee),
appeal mooted, 11 Bankr. 363 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (the union withdrew from the
Committee).
156. Note, supra note 149, at 366.
157. Telephone interview with Robert J. Rosenberg, counsel to the Committee of Asbestos-Related Litigants and/or Creditors (Feb. 3, 1983). Rosenberg stated that, as of Febuary 3,
1983, the Committee's position is that these individuals are not claimants and are thus not
affected by the Manville filing. Therefore, these individuals are not represented. If they are
awarded creditor status, provisions would be made for representation.
158. E.g., Whitman & Co., supra note 136, at 11-12.
159. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (1982).
160. E.g., Whitman & Co., supra note 136, at 11.
161. E.g., Id. at 11-12.
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sis victims would be denied due process."'
If the bankruptcy judge finds that potential asbestosis victims
have received adequate notice, it would appear that the other two
complaints could be satisfied. The issue of notice has been resolved
in two pre-Code cases. In In re DCA Development Corp.,16 3 an unsecured creditor challenged a court approved transfer of the debtor's
assets in a chapter XI arrangement proceeding. He asserted that his
right as a creditor to a fair hearing was denied due to insufficient
notice.""' The creditor had received notice of the first transfer hearing one day in advance and notice of the second hearing hours before
it was to be held. Although he was personally represented on both
occasions, he objected to the brief period between notice and each
hearing, claiming he had insufficient time to prepare his opposition
to the transfer.165 The court disagreed, and held notice was
sufficient.166
Although the DCA case is factually dissimilar from Manville,
the court's analysis of notice and due process sheds some light on the
interrelationship between notice and bankruptcy proceedings. The
DCA court focused on two Old Act sections16 7 authorizing the court
to establish notice requirements, and held that those provisions only
mandated "such notice and opportunity for a hearing as is reasonable and appropriate in each particular case. .

.

. This is nothing

more than traditional Due Process Clause analysis." 6 " Referring to
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 69 the DCA court held that "[t]he court
in each case must balance the individual's interest in adequate procedure against the overall interest of efficient, final resolution of
claims. 1 70 The DCA court added that efficient, final resolution of
claims is of special importance in bankruptcy proceedings because
delay could lead to a "diminution of corporate assets with no corresponding benefit to creditors. 17 1 Finally, the DCA court noted that
162.
163.

E.g., id. at 12.
489 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1973).

164. Id. at 44.
165.

Id. at 45-46.

166. Id. at 47.
167.

Id.'at 46; Old Act §§ 313(2), 315, 11 U.S.C. §§ 713(2), 715 (1976) (repealed

1978).
168.

489 F.2d at 46 (citation omitted).

169.

339 U.S. 306 (1950).

170. 489 F.2d at 46 (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313-14).

171. Id.
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"even where formal notice to affected parties is omitted or is insufficient, informal or constructive notice which provides them with the
same opportunity for a fair hearing can satisfy the procedural re172
quirements of the [Old] Act."
Another pre-Code case, more factually similar to the Manville
situation, is In re GAC Corp. 7s The relevant portion of the case concerned the adequacy of notice given to former holders of the debtor's
debentures who had already sold their certificates prior to the chapter X proceeding. These individuals had claims against the debtor
because of alleged securities violations. 4 The objection to notice
was filed by a debenture holder already participating in the proceeding on behalf of all those other prior holders who had not allegedly
received adequate notice. The court, in analyzing the steps taken by
the lower court, held that all debenture holders had received adequate notice.1 75 The notice, claimed to be insufficient, included a
"Claims Bar Order" mailed to approximately 280,000 potential
claimants, and publication of the order, twice, in fifty-three leading
newspapers.1 76 The order set the time, place, and form by which all
potential claimants were to file proofs of their claim or be barred
from participating in the chapter X proceeding. Although not all potential claimants were included in the direct mailing, the court concluded that the above procedure satisfied due process requirements. 77 The GAC court also quoted Mullane: "'An elementary
and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding
which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
[claims].' ",178 The court noted that notice by mail could be required
whenever the trustee has "actual knowledge of the existence of a
claim and the name and address of the claimant is easily ascertainable,"11 but held that this was not such a case. 1 80 Notice by.publication satisfied the requirements of due process because claims by
those no longer holding the debentures were speculative and the cost
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 47.
681 F.2d 1295 (1lth Cir. 1982).
Id. at 1297.
Id. at 1300.
Id. at 1297-98.
Id. at 1300.

178.

Id. (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314).

179.

Id. (emphasis in original).

180.

Id.
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and burden upon the trustees to ascertain the names and addresses
of all prior debenture holders mandated notice by publication.181
Both of these cases emphasize the important role a bankruptcy
court has in weighing the need for individual notice against the need
for resolution of the case at hand. Under the New Code, the court's
role has not changed. A creditor with a contingent claim must still
file a proof of claim, 18 2 but the court has discretion in setting the
time wherein proofs of claim must be submitted1 3 and the
form of
18 4
notice by which creditors are informed of the proceeding.
The court, in analyzing whether the 32,000 potential asbestosis
victims 85 can receive "notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise [them] of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their [claims],"186 will com181.

Id.

182. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (1982). Although the appellant in GAC wanted to file a class
proof of claim, the court, without holding that class proofs might never be permissible, indicated that no court or statutory provision specifically authorizes such a filing. GAC, 681 F.2d
at 1298-99. Certainly the Manville court could authorize such a step, but that possibility
seems unlikely despite rule 3001(b) of the Federal Bankruptcy Rules: "A proof of claim shall
be executed by the creditor or the creditor's authorized agent.
... R. PRACTICE & P.
BANKR. 3001(b) (emphasis added). The Manville court could conceivably accomplish the
same result by extending the time for individual filing. See infra note 183 and accompanying
text.
Although not expressly dealing with the filing of proofs of claim, Manville filed its request
that the bankruptcy court estimate the monetary amount of its total asbestos-related liability
as a class action. A Manville spokesman said, it was "'based upon the common interest of all
parties.'" Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 1983, at 16, col. 4; see also supra note 153.
183. "The court shall fix and for cause shown may extend the time within which proofs
of claim or interest may be filed." R. PRACTICE & P. BANKR. 3003(c)(3); see also House
Report, supra note 45, at 6307 ("The Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure will set the time limits
. . . for filing, which will determine whether claims are timely or tardily filed.").
184. "There shall be given such notice as is appropriate of an order for relief in a case
under this title." 11 U.S.C. § 342 (1982). "The court may order notice by publication if it
finds that notice by mail as provided in this rule is impracticable or that it is desirable to
supplement the notice." R. PRACTICE & P. BANKR. 2002(k). "The court may from time to
time enter orders designating the matters in respect to which, the person to whom, and the
form and manner in which notices shall be sent except as otherwise provided by these rules."
R. PRACTICE & P. BANKR. 2002(1); see also House Report, supra note 45, at 6287-88 ("The
Rules [of Bankruptcy Procedure] will prescribe to whom the notice should be sent, and in
what manner notice will be given.").
185. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
186. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
It is interesting to note that although a debtor company is supposed to replace its business
forms with those that read "Debtor in Possession," the bankruptcy judge permitted Manville
to retain its current forms. As Manville's bankruptcy attorney, Michael J. Crames, explained
"'[The replacement is] so everyone will know they're dealing with a company in bankruptcy.
We suggested to the judge that the publicity might be such that people would know about
Manville,'" and thus no replacement was required. N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1982, at Dl, col. 4.
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pare whatever notice is ultimately given with the harsh reality that if
these 32,000 individuals are denied creditor status-thus resulting in
a dismissal of the Manville petition-the Manville Corporation will
eventually lack sufficient funds to compensate the remaining asbestosis victims to any degree whatsoever. One observer appears to strike
the balance in favor of creditor status:
The human tragedy is that there are so many victims of asbestos-related diseases. Unfortunately, there are not enough assets
available in Manville to compensate all victims fully...
[B]ankruptcy may increase the pool of assets available to victims
[by shifting part of the inevitable losses to other classes of creditors
who might otherwise have been paid off in full and by applying the
money saved by not defending each tort suit individually to the
pool available for distribution]. The clear effect of bankruptcy will
be to allocate this pool more evenly among asbestos victims. While
currently identified victims may lose in the process, the as-yet-un187
identified victims, and perhaps the class as a whole, will gain.

2. Furtherance of Legislative Aims.-Even if the bankruptcy
court ultimately agrees with Manville's position that it is properly
within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, that will not end the
good faith analysis. Another indication of good faith is whether the
debtor is furthering the legislative aims of the bankruptcy system.
Although this factor is in no way determinative of the adequacy of notice and does involve the
awareness of the business community, the bankruptcy judge may find that the publicity given
to the Manville filing is related to the adequacy. of notice ultimately given to the potential
asbestosis victims.
If the bankruptcy judge should rule that the notice ultimately given satisfies the potential
asbestosis victims' due process, thus allowing the case to go forward, that decision will not be a
definitive bar to those individuals who later choose to challenge that ruling. "[There is] the
recognized principle that the court conducting the action cannot predetermine the resjudicata
effect of the judgment; this can be tested only in a subsequent action." FED. R. Civ. P. 23
advisory committee note (explaining 1966 amendment).
Depending upon the type of reorganization plan ultimately confirmed, arrangements could
be made to permit these subsequent creditor-victims to participate in the apportionment. Admitting that this could complicate matters, it should not preclude a current resolution of this
already complex matter. If the bankruptcy court should hold that notice is appropriate, it does
have statistical guidelines explaining how many potential asbestosis victims exist and can correlate that number with the total number that actually file proofs of claim. If far less than that
proposed number do file, the court could require further publication be given and/or extend
the deadline for filing claims. Furthermore, if an asbestosis money fund or corporate securities
are to be allocated as part of the plan, additional funds or securities could possibly be added at
a later date. This notewriter does not believe that such an added financial burden upon
Manville is great enough to detract from its desire for finality through the reorganization
process.
187. Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 1982, at 30, col. 3.
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"It has been long recognized that one who invokes the protective
provisions of the bankruptcy laws must do so in order to accomplish
and further the expressed legislative aim of the particular Chapter
and not for any other purpose." 188 Specifically, "those who invoke
the reorganization or rehabilitation provisions of the bankruptcy law
must do so in a manner consistent with the aims and objectives of
bankruptcy philosophy and policy-must, in short, do so in 'good
faith.' "189
To discern whether Manville's petition furthers the legislative
aims of the New Code, and more specifically, the chapter 11 reorganization provision, those aims must first be ascertained. Although
the new statute replaces the Old Act,190 the basic philosophy of business reorganization remains the same:191 "avoidance of the consequences of economic dismemberment and liquidation, and the preservation of ongoing values in a manner which does equity and is fair
to rights and interests of the parties affected."' 92 As the legislative
history indicates, the Old Act was archaic, 93 unable to handle effectively either the increased number of consumer bankruptcy cases or
the more complicated business reorganization cases. 9 The bankruptcy law needed to be revised and modernized, 95 and one result,
the new chapter 11, offered greater speed, efficiency, and protection
for debtors, creditors, and the public at large. 98
Two very important objectives surrounding business reorganizations, whether under the old or new law, are: (1) the preservation,
where possible, of an ongoing, but troubled business, 97 and (2) the
188. In re Mogul, 17 Bankr. 680, 681 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982).
189. In re Victory Constr. Co., 9 Bankr. 549, 558 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.), stay granted
pending appeal, 9 Bankr. 570 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981).
For a sampling of criticism alleging Manville's inappropriate use of the bankruptcy system, see N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1983, at D4, col. I & col. 5.
190. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
191. See In re Victory Constr. Co., 9 Bankr. 549, 558 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.), stay granted
pending appeal, 9 Bankr. 570 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981).
192.

Id.

193.

See generally House Report, supra note 45, at 5965-66 (discussing the main fail-

ings of the Old Act).

194. See Senate Report, supra note 56, at 5788-89.
195. See id.
196. See House Report, supra note 45, at 5966.
197.

In re Spenard Ventures, Inc., 18 Bankr. 164, 167 (Bankr. D. Ala. 1982); In re

Coram Graphic Arts, 11 Bankr. 641, 645 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Victory Constr. Co.,
9 Bankr. 549, 558 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.), stay granted pending appeal, 9 Bankr. 570 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1981); In re Century City, Inc., 8 Bankr. 25, 31 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980); In re Ponn

Realty Trust, 4 Bankr. 226, 230 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980); In re Diversified Leasing Servs., 4
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preservation of currently held jobs by the employees of the
threatened entity. 198 The first objective is premised on the fact that it
is more economically efficient to reorganize than liquidate because
"assets that are used for production in the industry for which they
were designed are more valuable than those same assets sold for
scrap." 199 Reorganization also furthers the public interest by preserving business opportunities. 00 Moreover, concerning the second
objective, reorganization is economically more efficient than liquidation since it preserves jobs 201 by minimizing unemployment, 20 2 another public interest concern. 03
If Manville is, in fact, financially troubled,204 its filing for reorganization furthers both objectives of the reorganization provision. If
Manville is precluded from attempts at reorganization today and the
current situation continues in the future, Manville will again seek
reorganization, or worse, be forced into liquidation. Liquidation of a
"Fortune 500" company would, indeed, be economically inefficient
and, therefore, Manville's current plight makes its chapter 11 filing
both appropriate and necessary. "[W]here

. .

. a once viable busi-

ness supporting employees and unsecured creditors has more recently
been burdened with judgments that threaten to put it out of existence, unless and until, rehabilitation has been shown to be unfeasiBANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 309, 312 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1978); House Report, supra note 45,
at 6179; B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, supra note 7, at 8.01; Elfin, Business Reorganization Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 12 PAC. L.J. 163, 164 (1980); see In re Bonded Mailings, Inc., 20 Bankr. 781, 785 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Alton Tel. Printing Co., 14
Bankr. 238, 241 (Bankr. S.D. Ill.
1981); see generally Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650
(1974) (discussing the Old Act in connection with the Consumer Credit Protection Act).
198. In re Coram Graphic Arts, I1Bankr. 641, 645 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (quoting
House Report, supra note 45, at 6179); see In re Bonded Mailings, Inc., 20 Bankr. 781, 785
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Alton Tel. Printing Co., 14 Bankr. 238, 241 (Bankr. S.D. Ill.
1981); In re Ponn Realty Trust, 4 Bankr. 226, 230 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980) (quoting House
Report, supra note 45, at 6179); In re Diversified Leasing Servs., 4 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR)
309, 312 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1978); B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, supra note 7, at 8.01;
Elfin, supra note 197, at 164.
199. In re Ponn Realty Trust, 4 Bankr. 226, 230 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980) (quoting
House Report, supra note 45, at 6179); see In re Noonan, 17 Bankr. 793, 797 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982); B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, supra note 7, at 8.01.
200. In re Diversified Leasing Servs., 4 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 309, 312 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1978).
201. In re Ponn Realty Trust, 4 Bankr. 226, 230 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980) (quoting
House Report, supra note 45; at 6179).
202. See B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, supra note 7, at %8.01.
203. See In re Diversified Leasing Servs., 4 BANKR. Cr.DEc. (CRR) 309, 312 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1978).
204. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
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ble, the bankruptcy courts are a most appropriate harbor within
which to weather the storm."2 5
Opponents, of course, argue that Manville can accomodate all
those asbestosis victims holding judgments against it and that
"'[tfhe bankruptcy laws weren't set up to allow bailouts for future
problems.' "208 Proponents, however, disagree, as one stated: "'If
there's not enough money to satisfy everyone who may ultimately
have a claim, the bankruptcy court is an appropriate place to apportion the damages, just as it is whenever creditors' claims exceed
assets. . ' "207
Since asbestosis claims will clearly continue to arise,20 8 planning
should occur now, before it is too late. This notewriter believes that
any cut-off point short of forced liquidation would be purely arbitrary. To base the allowance of Manville's reorganization petition
solely upon the actual number of tort claim filings and judgments
would be shortsighted and too mechanical. This is particularly true
in view of the fact that large numbers of claims will probably be
forthcoming. Such a cut-off point could also set the stage for possible
liquidation, resulting in both the demise of an ongoing business and
loss of jobs. This resultant liquidation would make it impossible to
compensate those individuals who will inevitably suffer from asbestos-related disease. Closing one's eyes to this tragic reality will not
make it disappear and delaying Manville's reorganization attempts
until another day will only adversely affect those future claimants
whose added misfortune it will be that they did not become ill
sooner. As Manville stated in its chapter 11 petition, "a point
[would] be reached where future successful [asbestosis] plaintiffs
would be unable to collect the amounts of their judgments or proposed settlements [and] all other creditors . . . would likewise be
confronted with the stark realization that they too could not be paid
nearly in full." 209 The petition was filed, "[t]herefore, in order to
treat all creditors of Manville even-handedly. 2 1 ° Manville's petition
for reorganization does, in fact, further the legislative aims of the
New Code.
3. Other Considerations.-If the bankruptcy court should
205.

In re Bonded Mailings, Inc., 20 Bankr. 781, 785 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).

206.

N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at D4, col. 1.

207.

Id.; see also supra note 187 and accompanying text.

208.

See supra notes 43, 187 and accompanying text.

209.

Debtor's Affidavit, supra note 2, at 8.

210. Id.
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agree with the foregoing contention, then it should necessarily reject
the assertion of Manville's opponents that the reorganization filing
was an abuse of the New Code's privileges. 11 Although it is true
that "[t]he Code is not to be abused by the extention of its rights
and privileges to those not within its contemplation," 212 Manville's
petition does further the legislative aims of the New Code. Its filing
may be unique, " but it is not an abuse of the system. 1 4
Opponents of the Manville petition also assert that the filing
was made with the intent to cause hardship and delay to the asbestosis victims.2 1 5 If this is indeed true, then the petition should be
deemed filed in bad faith and dismissal should result, since "[iff it is
obvious that a debtor is attempting unreasonably to deter or harass
creditors . . . , [then] good faith does not exist."21 6 Conversely, if
the bankruptcy court finds that Manville's petition is not in bad
faith, then Manville will be entitled to benefit from all of the New
Code's privileges 21 7 despite the delays inherent in a statutory reorganization. For example, the automatic stay provision,
which has
halted all asbestosis litigation against Manville, cannot be considered
211. See Kelly, supra note 5, at 17; N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at D4, col. 1.
212. In re Victory Constr. Co., 9 Bankr. 549, 565 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.), stay granted
pending appeal, 9 Bankr. 570 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981); see also In re Nancant, Inc., 8 Bankr.
1005, 1008 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981) (citation omitted).
213. N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at D4, col. 1.
214. See id.
215. N.Y Times, Sept. 1, 1982, at DI, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at D4, col. 1.
216. In re Northland Constr. Co., 560 F.2d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting In re
Loeb Apartments, Inc., 89 F.2d 461, 463 (7th Cir. 1937)); cf. In re Horizon Hosp., Inc., 7
BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 682, 683 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) ("a fraudulent or improper invocation of [the bankruptcy court's] jurisdiction would certainly be a 'cause' for dismissal.").
It is again interesting to note Judge Lifland's comments in an earlier case: "In determining a lack of good faith, the court should emphasize the intent to abuse the judicial process
rather than to delay creditors." In re Eden Assocs., 13 Bankr. 578, 584 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1981); see supra note 53.
"Unreasonable delay" is also one of the nine enumerated clauses permitting the court to
dismiss a case. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(3) (1982).
217. In In re Bonded Mailings, Inc., 20 Bankr. 781 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982), although
the bankruptcy court found that the debtor had previously engaged in fraudulent conduct
designed to frustrate its creditor's attempts to enforce a prior court judgment, the court refused to dismiss the chapter 11 petition. The court held that the debtor, a formerly viable
business threat~ned with immense judgments, was in need of statutory relief. Id. at 784-85.
Manville's school creditors cite Bonded Mailings for the proposition that "[e/ven if the Committee of Asbestos-Related Litigants and/or Creditors' charge that the Debtors' filing is part
of a scheme to prevent them from obtaining fair compensation is credited on the sparse record
before this Court, that claim does not establish bad faith or warrant dismissal." School Creditors, supra note 75, at 9 n.*.
218. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982); see supra note 45.
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delay for purposes of finding bad faith. 21' Furthermore, it is both
anticipated and accepted that large companies seeking reorganization will probably require more time to complete the reorganization
process. This is evidenced by the House Report's comments regarding the statutory time permitted the debtor to file a reorganization

plan:
The bill gives the debtor an exclusive right to propose a plan for
120 days. In most cases, 120 days will give the debtor adequate
time to negotiate a settlement, without unduly delaying creditors.
The court is given the power, though, to increase or reduce the
120-day period depending on the circumstances of the case. For
example, if an unusually large company were to seek reorganization under chapter 11, the court would probably need to extend
220
the time in order to allow the debtor to reach an agreement.
219. See In re Northwest Recreational Activities, Inc., 4 Bankr. 36, 39 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga.) (automatic stay is not delay which would trigger liability under Georgia's fraudulent
conveyance act), plan confirmation, 4 Bankr. 43 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980); House Report,
supra note 45, at 6296-97.
220. House Report, supra note 45, at 6191 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see
also I1 U.S.C. § 1121(d) (1982): "On request of a party in interest ... the court may...
increase the 120-day period .... ").
One notewriter has compiled a sampling of the time it took for large corporations to
reorganize: "Dolly Madison Industries (seven years, five months), King Resources (seven
years), Equity Funding (four years, eight months), United States Financial (four years, four
months), and Interstate Sales (three years, I1 months)." Note, supra note 149, at 355 n.40.
The reorganization plan of Bobbie Brooks, Inc., a clothing manufacturer, was recently confirmed and the company is now out of chapter 11 proceedings. The process took a little over
one year. Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 1983, at 16, col. 3.
Similar time delays have plagued the Manville case as Manville had been granted 10
extensions since its initial filing. N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1983, at D4, col. 6. Manville submitted
its reorganization plan on November 21, 1983, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1983, at D15, col. 1., the
date of its final deadline. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1983, at D4, col. 6. The tenth extension was
requested by both Manville and the asbestosis claimants, id., while the ninth extension had
been requested by Manville's commercial creditors' attorney. Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1983, at 60,
col. 2. Bankruptcy Judge Lifland granted the ninth extension after refusing to accept one of
Manville's plan proposals. He then instructed the parties to continue negotiations in order to
develop a plan which would be acceptable to Manville and its creditors. Id. The most significant problems at that time involved Manville and the asbestosis victims' attorneys, with the
commercial creditors apparently acting as the mediator. Id. These, as well as other problems,
continued to plague the reorganization when Manville submitted its plan. N.Y. Times, Nov.
22, 1983, at DI 5, col. 1. For a further discussion of Manville's past proposals and current plan,
see supra note 153.
The Committee of Asbestos-Related Litigants and/or Creditors originally filed a motion
to dismiss the Manville Chapter 11 petitions in the bankruptcy court. After the seventh extension was granted, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1983, at D3, col. 1, however, the Committee moved to
withdraw the motion to dismiss-then pending in bankruptcy court-and have the district
court, instead, rule on the motion. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., Nos. 82 B 11656 to 82 B
11676 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1983) (unpublished memorandum decision). GAF Corporation, one

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1983

35

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:121

Finally, opponents of Manville's reorganization petition further
assert that Manville is attempting to avoid large damages awards, 221
especially since Manville had, prior to its petition, been found liable
for punitive damages. 222 Although this note has dealt exclusively
with the appropriateness of Manville's filing a petition for reorganization relief and not an analysis of any conceivable plan, it is possi-

ble, albeit uncertain, that a bankruptcy court might award punitive
damages to a creditor in appropriate circumstances. 223
of Manville's codefendants in several asbestos tort suits, joined the motion requesting removal.
District Judge Stewart, however, denied their motion. Id. Judge Stewart reasoned: "The Bankruptcy Courts are well acquainted with claims of bad faith filings. While the allegations of
conspiracy and constitutional violations perhaps raise more complicated questions [than] the
usual bad faith filing case, we are not convinced that these elements warrant withdrawal of the
motions from the Bankruptcy Court." Id.; see N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1983, at D4, col. 4. The
motion to dismiss was argued before Bankruptcy Judge Lifland on January 5, 1984 and the
decision is pending. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1984, at D3, col. 6.
The district court's involvement in the Manville case also extended to the issue of the
estimation of future claims. On October 14, 1983, District Judge Edelstein, although not deciding this specific issue, stated that he would personally take under advisement the general
question of whether unknown future asbestosis victims should be bound by any current reorganization plan. Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 1983, at 3, col. 2. On October 25, Judge Edelstein
proposed that Manville create a 20-year sinking fund to pay the claims of those individuals
exposed to asbestos, but not yet ill or aware of their illness. Wall St. J., Oct. 26, 1983, at 10,
col. 1. The plan which Manville submitted, however, does not include such a proposal. See
supra note 153.
Judge Edelstein's proposal appears to require that all creditors accept less payment now in
order to guarantee the rights of future victims. He stated: "'I am not going to be satisfied with
any plan that shows we are expunging the rights of future claimants.'" Wall St. J., Oct. 26,
1983, at 10, col. 1. Although officially involved in only part of the Manville reorganization,
Judge Edelstein may be prepared to hear the entire case. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at DI,
col. 1.
221. N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1982, at DI, col. 1.
222. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
223. See In re Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc., 4 Bankr. 635, 645 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980)
(court did not assess punitive damages against the debtor in a chapter 11 reorganization since
it found the debtor's conduct stemmed from "honest confusion and a lack of money"). But see
In re GAC Corp., 681 F.2d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 1982) (court refused to assess punitive
damages against the debtor in a chapter X proceeding because "the effect of allowing a punitive damages claim would be to force innocent creditors to pay for the bankrupt's wrongdoing,"). One notewriter suggested that Manville's plan be based on a "modified workers' compensation type-system" which would preclude punitive damage recovery. Note, The Impact of
a Solvent Corporation's Reorganization on Products Liability Claimants, 4 CARDOZO L.
Rav. 519, 543 (1983).
Prior to Manville's request that the court estimate its total asbestos-related liability, see
supra note 153, Manville outlined a reorganization proposal. That proposal would have sought
determination of each claim through arbitration, a system which does not usually assess punitive damages. N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1983, D4, col. 4. Manville's currently proposed plan, submitted November 21, 1983, as expected, precludes punitive damage awards. See supra note
153.
Options available to the bankruptcy court could minimize the benefits Manville is seeking

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol12/iss1/4

36

Friedman: Manville: Good Faith Reorganization or "Insulated" Bankruptcy
1983]

MANVILLE REORGANIZATION

III.

CONCLUSION

Confronting tens of thousands of asbestos-related claims, the
Manville Corporation realized that its only means of survival was to
file for corporate reorganization under chapter 11 of the New Code.
Although it is presently solvent and seeking to minimize its liability
due to both current and future asbestosis claims, these factors should
not, per se, preclude Manville from utilizing this opportunity to salvage its corporate existence.
Despite opponents' claims that Manville is merely attempting to
escape state court proceedings, closer analysis reveals that the corporation is truly in financial difficulty. Similarly, critics' complaints
that Manville lacks sufficient debt to warrant bankruptcy protection
are also unfounded. Present claims added to the multitude of claims
that will surely arise in the future make Manville an appropriate
debtor. In fact, Manville has fulfilled the jurisdictional prerequisites
for reorganization, and has, indeed, filed its petition in good faith.
Moreover, although the New Code was not adopted with Manville's
specific facts in mind, permitting Manville to utilize the bankruptcy
process is consistent with the legislative aims underlying the Code.
Finally, it is only through the reorganization process and the
classification of future claimants as present creditors, that the as-yetunknown asbestosis victims can be assured some hope of adequate
compensation from the source of their injuries. Without the opportunity to reorganize, Manville may be forced to liquidate its assets,
leaving these future claimants potentially remediless-with no one to
'
sue but a penniless "deep pocket." 224
Sandrea Friedman
to achieve through its reorganization. For example, the court might award punitive damages.
Alternatively, it could force Manville to litigate each asbestos-related claim in the court where
each suit was originally filed, 28 U.S.C. § 1471(d) (Supp. V 1981), rather than determine the
liability issue or estimate the value of each contingent claim. If the bankruptcy court were to
utilize this latter option, the costs to Manville of litigating each claim separately would be
staggering, see supra note 41 and accompanying text, and would result in less funds available
for the creditors' pool.
224. As this note went to press, Bankruptcy Judge Lifland rendered two decisions in the
Manville case, In re Johns-Manville Corp., Nos. 82 B 11656 to 82 B 11676 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 23, 1984) (Decision and Order on Motions to Dismiss Manville's Chapter 11 Petition
("Decision No. I"), and Decision and Order on Keene's Motion to Appoint a Legal Representative for Future Claimants ("Decision No. 2")), and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit dismissed the appeal filed by UNR Industries, In re UNR Indus., No. 83-1704 (7th
Cir. Jan. 17, 1984).
In Decision No. 1, Judge Lifland denied four motions to dismiss the Manville petition. Of
these four motions, three were premised on the theory that future asbestosis victims are neither
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cognizable nor dischargeable, in bankruptcy. The court denied these motions because, whether
or not the victims' interests are indeed dischargeable, they are "parties in interest" pursuant to
§ 1109(b) of the New Code. As a result of this conclusion, Judge Lifland found insufficient
cause to dismiss the petition. The fourth motion to dismiss, filed by the Committee of Asbestos-Related Litigants and/or Creditors, alleging bad faith in the filing of the petition, was also
denied since the Committee had not substantiated its allegations of fraud. Judge Lifland commented on Congress' intent of liquidation avoidance and its obvious relationship to the case at
bar. He found no jurisdictional abuse of the bankruptcy court in Manville's filing, but rather, a
company in dire need of reorganization. Judge Lifland emphasized, however, that pursuant to
§ 1129 of the New Code, good faith, in this case, will be most appropriately examined in
connection with plan confirmation.
In Decision No. 2, Judge Lifland granted a motion for the appointment of a legal representative for the future asbestosis victims' interests. He also commented on the diverse state
statutes of limitations and reasoned that, in order to treat all victims fairly, a uniform standard
applying a manifestation formula should be utlized for purposes of allowability of claims in
bankruptcy. Although the issue of dischargeability was not before the court, Judge Lifland, in
dicta, noted the broad definition of "claim" in § 101(4) of the New Code and the congressional intent that all of a debtor's obligations be handled in a reorganization. Aware of the due
process requirement of adequate notice, Judge Lifland stated that although the problem would
be difficult to resolve, it would not be insurmountable. Both decisions have been appealed.
The Seventh Circuit, in UNR, held that the district court's refusal to appoint a legal
representative for future asbestosis victims was not a final order and, hence, not ripe for appellate review. The court did, however, in dicta, comment on the issue of potential asbestosis
victims and the extent of their relationship to the reorganization case at bar. The Seventh
Circuit noted that individuals exposed to asbestos in states where a cause of action accrues
upon inhalation would appear to have claims provable in bankruptcy. Moreover, the court
further commented that even in states where manifestation is the trigger for accrual (and
further assuming the term "claim" defined in § 101(4) could not encompass these individuals),
a bankruptcy court might be able to use its equitable powers to provide for future asbestosis
victims upon final approval of a reorganization plan. Although it was merely dicta, the court's
sensitivity to the complex issue of what rights and interests future asbestosis victims might
possess in the UNR reorganization is clearly apparent.
[An unpublished copy of this note was cited in both of these cases-EDs.]
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